Fifteen years ago White (2002) provided estimates of aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy -the percentage of aggregate economic activity that could be attributed to the largest "X" companies -that covered primarily the last quarter of the 20 th century. Those data sets showed that despite major merger waves during that period, aggregate concentration at the end of the 1990s was lower than it had been in the early 1980s, although there had been some upward movement after the mid 1990s.
I. Introduction.
The apparent aggregate concentration -the percentage of economic activity that is accounted for by the largest X firms -seems to be growing in the U.S. economy. Media references to "Big Oil", "Big Pharma", "Big Food", "Wall Street", etc., convey the idea that the U.S. economy is increasingly dominated by large firms. Prominent reporting of proposed and consummated "mega-mergers" does the same.
Surprisingly -at least to us -quantitative measures of recent levels of aggregate concentration are not readily available. White (2002) provided estimates for the 1980s and 1990s, but since then (to our knowledge) there have been no studies that have updated/extended those data. A partial explanation for this dearth is that the relevant data are not regularly compiled by government agencies.
In this paper we update White's (2002) estimates with data that cover the first and part of the second decades of the 21 st century. By combining the earlier data with our new data, we are able to provide a longer sweep of data that -at least for some economy-wide measures of aggregate concentration -extend back to the early 1980s (and for the manufacturing sector extend back to 1947).
As a summary, we find that aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy -as measured by employment, payroll, and profits -appears to have risen moderately but steadily since the mid 1990s. This increase does not, however, appear to have raised aggregate concentration above the levels of the early 1980s. We also compute annual Gini coefficients for 1988-2014 for employment by firm size and payroll by firm size. We find gradual annual increases in both sets of Gini coefficients for this time period. These increases appear to be due to increases in the sizes of larger firms generally and not just increases by the largest firms.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows: In section II we ask why the issue of aggregate concentration is interesting in the first place. Section III provides a literature review. Section IV addresses measurement issues. Section V provides the employment and payroll data from the Bureau of the Census. Section VI provides the employment and profits data from the annual Fortune and Forbes lists of the 500 largest companies that are headquartered in the U.S. Section VII contains a brief conclusion.
II. Why Is Aggregate Concentration Interesting?
At the beginning, it is important to separate the measurement of aggregate concentration from the measurements of seller concentration in specific markets that are the staple of antitrust investigations and litigation. 1 The latter measurements are part of the effort to determine whether market power -the ability to maintain a price that is significantly above competitive levels for a sustained period -is present (or could become present) in a specific relevant market.
2
The markets that are thereby delineated are often narrow: e.g., local or regional in their geographic scope, and encompassing narrow product categories. The absolute size of a firm usually doesn't matter; it is the firm's sales as a percentage of all sales in that delineated market that does matter.
By contrast, aggregate concentration is an economy-wide measure, and the absolute size of a firm does matter. However, aggregate concentration has little or no relevance for antitrust, since there is no necessary connection to seller concentration in individual markets. As an easy illustration of this point, suppose that there were only 100 giant companies that accounted for all 1 See, for example, Kwoka and White (2014) . 2 Seller concentration -whether measured by the largest X firms (often X = 4) or by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -is, of course, just one component of the market-power determination.
of the private-sector output in the U.S. economy. This would be an extremely high level of aggregate concentration. But if all 100 companies were present as sellers in all U.S. markets with roughly equal market shares, the measured levels of seller concentration in those individual markets would be far below the levels that would ordinarily raise antitrust concern. 3 And, if one believed that economies of scale and of scope could still be exploited by companies that each represented approximately $150 billion in value added (and that the potential diseconomies from the difficulties of managing such large enterprises were not a problem), then the static efficiency/productivity of this hypothetical economy would be greater than for a more atomized economy.
Nevertheless, an economy that was thoroughly dominated by only 100 -or even 1,000 -giant companies would surely have a different "feel" from the U.S. economy in which we actually live. To illustrate the latter: The U.S. Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income reported that for 2013 4 in the U.S. economy there were: 24.1 million sole proprietorships with $1.3 trillion in sales receipts; 3.5 million partnerships with $5.9 trillion in sales receipts; and 5.9 million corporations with $30.2 trillion in sales receipts. 5 An economy with only 100 giant companies would surely feel more stifling, with no outlets for entrepreneurial spirits, far fewer employment choices, far fewer places where innovative ideas might take root and thrive, etc.
Thus, a focus on aggregate concentration addresses questions that are largely about the "feel" of a society, although there are serious economic (but not antitrust) issues as well.
3 Of course, one would worry about whether multi-market contact among these 100 firms -the same firms would be "meeting" each other in multiple markets -might be an inhibition on fully competitive behavior. See, for example, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) . 4 Although 2014 data are now available for sole proprietorships and partnerships, only 2013 data are currently available for corporations. In order to keep the data horizontally consistent, we provide the 2013 data. 5 Since the private-sector GDP in 2013 was only $14.5 trillion, there is an obvious double-counting problem that accompanies the summation of sales receipts data across the entire private sector. We will return to this problem below.
One other preliminary issue should be addressed: There is no "right" level of aggregate concentration to which anyone can refer; but it is possible -with sufficiently good data -to measure changes in the level of aggregate concentration over time. If one believes that aggregate concentration matters, then the measurement of changes over time to help determine whether things are getting better or worse (subject, of course, to the caveat about efficiency/productivity mentioned above) is worthwhile.
It is the measurement of those changes that is the subject of this paper.
III. Previous Literature. 14 Similarly, if the worldwide franchisees' gross sales revenues were added to the company's revenues from its owned-and-operated stores, the company's worldwide sales would instead be $82.7 billion. At this level of aggregate worldwide "sales", the company would have been ranked by Fortune as the 31 st largest company headquartered in the U.S., slightly ahead of IBM. 15 Suppose that a manufacturing company that previously consisted of a "components" division and an "assembly" division (and was thus vertically integrated) decides to dis-integrate vertically into two wholly separate components and assembly companies. As a recent example, in November 2016 the previously vertically integrated Alcoa Inc. was split into an "upstream" aluminum smelting and refining company (Alcoa Corp.) and a "downstream" aluminum parts manufacturing company (Arconic Inc.). On a pro forma basis the two separate companies are together the same size as the previous vertically integrated company. But if sales revenues are the measure of size, then the new assembly company would be considered to be the same size as the previous vertically integrated company; and the new components company would add to the aggregated sales revenues of the economy. A vertical merger, of course, would reverse this process.its franchisees' sales revenues (instead of just the royalties that they pay to McDonald's) were included in the company's aggregate sales.
In contrast to these two problematic measures, the use of value added -approximately, the sum of labor costs plus profits -for a company avoids the double-counting problem and thus allows for a natural aggregation across companies. Value added does provide a standardized measure across all companies of the contribution of the company to the overall economy.
Value added, of course, does not measure consumer surplus. Accordingly, the value added that would be recorded for a consumer-facing company such as Facebook may well understate the measure of its importance if somehow consumer surplus could be included.
Further, for a franchisee such as McDonald's, its value added (if reported) would be smaller than if the value added of all of its franchisees (rather than just their royalty payments) were included the company's value added.
17 But this latter issue is just a "fact of life" of vertical disintegration versus vertical integration: Presumably, McDonald's finds it to be profit-maximizing to operate its U.S. stores with 90% of them owned by franchisees, rather than trying to own-andoperate all of them itself.
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Unfortunately, the drawback to the use of value added is that it is not reported individually by companies. Furthermore, although government data do include value added for broad industry sectors, those data are useful for our purposes only for manufacturing, where the concentration (based on value added) of the largest X companies is regularly reported.
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However, one of the two components of value added -company profits -is reported for publicly traded companies and can thus be aggregated across companies. And the employment part of the other component of value added -company labor costs -is also reported for publicly traded companies and can be aggregated across companies. We can thus achieve somewhat imperfect approximations to the value added measures that would (arguably) be ideal.
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B. What about geography? Large companies that are headquartered in the U.S. often have extensive non-U.S. operations and employees, and their international involvement has been growing over time. As the data above for Wal-Mart indicate, in 2015 over a third of its sales revenues arose outside the U.S., and over a third of its employees were located outside the U.S.;
by comparison, Wal-Mart in 1995 had less than 5% of its employees outside the U.S., and non-U.S. sales apparently weren't considered important enough to be reported separately.
At the same time, large companies with headquarters outside the U.S. are increasingly producing goods and services in the U.S. Sometimes this expansion has occurred organicallyas occurred, for example, in the automobile industry, where Japanese, Korean, and European car manufacturers have established assembly and sales operations in the U.S. This expansion has also occurred through mergers and acquisitions by non-U.S. companies that absorb U.S.-headquartered companies -as has additionally occurred in the auto industry, where Chrysler is owned by Fiat (an Italian company), and has occurred in the beer industry, where AnheuserBusch is owned by AB InBev (a Belgian company).
How should such geographic considerations enter into the measurement of aggregate concentration? If an aggregate concentration measure is based solely on companies that are headquartered in the U.S., then it is likely that their worldwide operations will be included in any 20 And, as will be discussed below, the U.S. Bureau of the Census has provided special annual tabulations of labor costs for the largest X firms, which allows us to get closer to a value added measure.
aggregations; and the aggregations will miss the U.S. operations of companies (such as Chrysler and Anheuser-Busch) that are headquartered abroad. 21 Aggregations that are based on the U.S.
operations of all companies that do business in the U.S. will include those foreign-headquartered companies' operations but will miss some of the "heft" that attaches to U.S.-headquartered companies that have substantial operations abroad.
In sum, there are pluses and minuses to various measurement and geographic bases for the compilation of aggregate concentration measures. And, since the data are sparse, we will present what is available and offer commentary as we proceed.
V. Data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
A. Value added data. As was discussed above, value added data probably represent the best data for measuring aggregate concentration. Nevertheless, value added is not a metric that companies regularly report in their individual financial statements; so value added does not appear in compilations (such as those of Fortune and Forbes) that rely on company financial statements.
However, for the overall manufacturing sector, the twice-a-decade "Census of Manufactures" (compiled by the Bureau of the Census) has reported the concentration of value added by the largest X companies since 1947. 22 The time series of the manufacturing sector value added concentration data -for the largest 50, 100, 150, and 200 companies -are presented in 25 These data are currently available through 2014. They are organized into a set of firm-size employment "buckets", which start at 0-4 employees and extend to 10,000+ employees. These data -for the nine firm-size buckets that have been available through all 27 years -are reproduced in Tables 2-8 .
As can be seen in Table 2 , the numbers of firms in the largest (10,000+) category grew between 1988 and around 2000 and has remained relatively stable since then; the percentage figures in Table 3 tell the same story. In terms of employment, a similar story appears in Tables   24 The next "Census of Manufactures" is scheduled to be conducted for 2017. The data for that year are unlikely to be available before 2019 or 2020. 25 These data thus include the U.S. employment and payroll of companies that are headquartered outside the U.S. More information about these data can be found in White (2002) Finally, Tables 7 and 8 provide the payroll data for the size categories. The wage data in Table 7 are not corrected for inflation. The percentage data in Table 8 show the same pattern as in the earlier tables: The share of aggregate payroll by the largest firms grew between 1988 and around 2000 and has remained roughly constant since then.
An immediate qualifier to the payroll data is important: These data cover employees' compensation 26 but do not include the company's contributions/payments toward companyprovided fringe benefits, such as healthcare, retirement programs, etc. Thus, these payroll data will be an underestimate of the total labor costs of companies.
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The data in these tables can't really help us address the "largest X firms" question.
However, the percentage data in the size buckets in Tables 3, 5 , and 8 can be used to compute a wider measure of concentration: Gini coefficients for firm employment and for firm payrolls.
These Gini coefficients for 1988-2014 are presented in Table 9 . As can be seen, the time series 26 See https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/about/glossary.html . 27 Also, the payroll data come from the same source as the Census Bureau's "County Business Patterns" reports: payroll data through March of each calendar year, as collected for Social Security/Medicare wage tax purposes. Starting in 2013, when the Medicare tax was expanded to cover all wage/salary income, these payroll data are likely to be comprehensive. But prior to 2013, the data would have underestimated the payroll costs for super-high earners whose first-quarter incomes exceeded the maximum annual income that was subject to Social Security tax. In 1988 that cap was $45,000; in 2011 it was $106,800.
for both categories show small but more-or-less steady growth over this 27-year period. 28 For the employment series, the growth from the first year to the last is almost exactly 0.001 per year (from 0.826 in 1988 to 0.854 in 2014); for the payroll series, the annual growth is slightly larger (from 0.839 to 0.880). The consistently larger Gini coefficient for payrolls (as compared to employment) implies that the larger firms across the economy tend to pay higher wages and salaries to their employees than do the smaller firms. The same pattern can be seen in Tables 5 and 8: For the larger firms, their percentage of total payrolls is larger than their percentage of total employment.
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To put the magnitude of the Gini coefficients and their changes somewhat in perspective:
Suppose that there are only two size buckets, and that the smallest P% of firms (where P is expressed as a decimal; i.e., 80% is expressed as 0.80) account for (1-P)% of employment (or payroll); the remaining (1-P)% of larger firms account for the remaining P% of employment (or payroll). Then the resulting Gini coefficient would be equal to 2P -1. 30 Thus, the initial Gini coefficient for employment in 1988 of 0.826 would be yielded by a two-bucket employment distribution where the largest 8.7% of all firms employed 91.3% of all employees; 31 the 2014
Gini coefficient for employment of 0.854 would be yielded by a distribution where the largest 7.3% firms employed 92.7% of all employees. When seen through this lens, the increase in the Gini coefficient does appear to be more substantial. 28 For some years the Census Bureau provided a larger number of intermediate size buckets for the SUSB data. The time patterns for the Gini coefficients that are computed from those more finely segmented buckets are consistent with the patterns that are shown in Table 9 . 29 The size category of 500-999 employees appears to be the dividing point between the categories that pay higher wages and the categories that pay lower wages. 30 This follows readily from the geometry of computing the Gini coefficient from two size buckets: The area under the Lorenz curve consists of two triangles -each with an area of 0.5 x P x (1 -P) -plus a square with an area of (1 -P)
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. The Gini coefficient is equal to 0.5 minus the summed area under the Lorenz curve, all divided by 0.5. 31 This 2-bucket equivalence is somewhat similar in spirit to the "equal-size firms equivalent" measure that Adelman (1969) provided for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Tables 5 and 8 shows that the rising Gini coefficients for both series are driven by rising percentages of employment and payrolls for larger firms generally (and correspondingly falling percentages for smaller firms), with the size category of 100-499 employees showing relatively unchanged percentages. This is highlighted in Table 10, which shows the annualized percentage changes in the shares of employment and of payrolls by the various employment size categories.
An examination of
Finally, a special data tabulation by the Bureau of the Census of these SUSB data has yielded the "largest X" percentages for employment and for payrolls for the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 companies in the U.S. for the 1988-2014 period. These data are in Table 11 . As was reported by White (2002) , aggregate concentration fell from 1988 through the mid 1990s. Since then the pattern has been mixed: Aggregate employment concentration for all three categories has risen gradually, so that by 2014 the percentages were moderately above the levels in 1988.
For aggregate payroll concentration, however, the percentage for the largest 100 companies has hardly risen, while the percentages for the largest 500 and 1,000 companies have risen moderately but were still (as of 2014) below the levels for 1988.
One other interesting phenomenon is found in Table 11 : Until the late 1990s, the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 companies' payroll percentages exceeded their employment percentages. As was true of the large firm categories in Tables 5 and 8 , large firms tended to pay above-average wages and salaries to their employees. However, since the early 2000s the payroll percentage for the largest 100 firms has been below their employment share: The largest 100 firms pay payroll wages and salaries that (on average) are lower than is true for companies in general. And for the largest 500 and 1,000 firms the differential between their payroll percentages and their employment percentages -though consistently positive -had narrowed by the late 1990s and have stayed at those narrower differences since then.
However, as was discussed above, the payroll data that are collected and published by the SUSB program do not include employer-provided/funded fringe benefits. The relative decline in the payroll percentages for these large companies may simply be an indication that they are compensating their employees more with fringe benefits that are non-taxable to their employees than are smaller businesses.
VI. Data from Fortune and Forbes.
The "Fortune 500" list of large companies is probably the best-known of such lists.
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Since 1955, Fortune magazine has published every spring a list of 500 large (based on annual sales revenues) companies that are headquartered in the U.S. The data for the companies are drawn from those companies' financial reports for the previous calendar year and always include the firms' sales revenues and profits and end-of-year assets and stock market values; sometimes total employees are included. Because the data are taken from the companies' consolidated financial reports, the companies' consolidated worldwide operations are included.
Initially, the annual lists contained solely large "industrial" companies: i.e., manufacturing and mining companies. Services companies -e.g., large financial companies, utilities, railroads, airlines, etc. -were not included. Starting in the 1960s, the Fortune annual lists began to include large financial and other services companies, and the data for the 1970s were sufficiently consistent to allow aggregate concentration estimates for that decade. 33 32 For securities market investing, however, the "S&P 500" may be at least as well known. 33 See White (1981; 2002) and Golbe and White (1988) .
However, in the 1980s and the early 1990s there was insufficient year-to-year consistency in what categories were included or excluded. Consequently, for that period the Fortune annual lists are not suitable for our purposes.
From 1993 onward, however, the Fortune annual lists have been sufficiently consistent in composition to allow year-to-year comparisons. From the Fortune annual data we extract the employment and profits of the 500 largest companies (as ranked by annual sales) 34 and divide by total private-sector employment and after-tax corporate profits, respectively. The resulting percentages are shown in Table 11 . As can be seen, the annual employment percentages are relatively stable but show a modest increase from the mid 1990s to the mid 2010s. The annual profit percentages are much more variable and cyclical, dipping substantially (as would be expected) during the recession years of 2002 and 2008. Again, there seems to be a modest increase in the annual percentages from the mid 1990s to the mid 2010s.
For a longer perspective, these Fortune-based data can be combined with annual data for the 500 largest companies (measured somewhat differently) that were published by Forbes from 1980 through 2000. 35 Again, the annual employment and profits data are divided by the relevant national aggregates. These Forbes-based data are also presented in Table 12 . 36 As can be seen, the employment percentages for the two data sets for the overlapping years (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) are quite consistent 37 (and they are consistent with the SUSB-based data on employment percentages for 34 Again, this is based on their worldwide operations and excludes any company that is not headquartered in the U.S. 35 After 2000 the annual Forbes data became unusable for our purposes. Discussion of the 1980-2000 Forbes data can be found in White (2002) . 36 The Forbes percentage data that appear here are somewhat different than those that appeared in Table 8 in White (2002) . For the profit percentage, the difference is due to a different national corporate profits series being used as the denominator. For the employment percentage, there seems to have been an inexplicable error in the calculations of the percentages in the last column of Table 8 of White (2002): As compared with the percentages presented here in Table 11 , the levels there seem to be too low by about a quarter; but the year-to-year changes are quite consistent. 37 Because the Forbes annual employment data are drawn from the largest 500 firms ranked by employment, whereas the Fortune annual employment data are drawn from the largest 500 firms ranked by sales, the Forbes percentages would be expected to be somewhat larger than the Fortune percentages -which they generally are.
the 500 largest companies for these same years that are shown in Table 10 ). The profit percentages for the Forbes-based data are higher than those for Fortune; 38 but the year-to-year changes (except for 1993-1994) are roughly consistent. The Forbes-based data show a decline in employment percentages and profit percentages from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.
If we assess the two annual data sets and their overlap, the following seems to be a reasonable conclusion: Between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s there was a decline in aggregate concentration as shown by the annual employment percentages and profit percentages of the 500 largest firms in the U.S. economy. Since the mid 1990s, there appear to have been modest increases in both percentages; but those percentages do not seem to have regained the levels of the early 1980s.
VII. Conclusion.
As was discussed at the beginning of this paper, the level of aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy has little connection to the state of competition in relevant markets and thus to antitrust policy in the U.S. 39 However, it may tell us something about the "tone" of the society in which we live.
Aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy has been rising moderately in the early 21 st century -but not by as much as the political and media references to large corporations might indicate. The data -based on the employment, payrolls, and profits of large companies -are clear in this regard.
38 This is for the same reason as applies to the employment data: The Forbes annual profit data are drawn from the largest 500 companies ranked by profits, whereas the Fortune annual profit data are drawn from the largest 500 companies ranked by sales. What is less clear (of course) is whether this trend is desirable or not. Our data cannot provide an answer to that question. But it is surely better to have some facts for help in shaping any discussion on this topic. 
